Agricultural finance: 1990-2004 by Zumbika, Naison
1ZIMBABWE'S
AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION 
REVISITED
Edited By:
Mandivamba Rukuni,
Patrick Tawonezvi,
Carl Eicher
witt Mabel Munyuki-Hungwe 
and Prosper Matondi
ISBN 0-86924-141-9
Published by University of Zimbabwe Publications, P. O. Box MP 167,
Mt. Pleasant, Harare, Zimbabwe 
First printed: 2006
Publishing consultant: Margo Bedingfield,
Cover and inside photographs supplied by Manfred Takaendesa, Centre for Rural 
Development
© Editors -  Mandivamba Rukuni, Patrick Tawonezvi and Carl Eicher with 
Mabel Munyuki-Hungwe and Prosper Matondi, 2006 
© Individual contributors, 2006 
Printed by Sable Press Private Limited
Reproduction of this publication for educational or other non-commercial 
purposes is authorized without prior written permission from the copyright 
holder provided the source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of the 
publication for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without prior 
permission of the copyright holder.
12 Agricultural input supply......_____________________ ..........---------— 279
Joseph Rusike and Chrispen Sukume
Evolution of fertilizer systems and performance: 1930-1990 ....................  279
Agricultural input supply................................................................................. 281
Supply systems and performance under structural adjustment.....................287
Supply systems and performance under the fast track land resettlement
programme.........................................................................................................291
Restructuring fertilizer supply systems: major challenges........................... 293
Conclusion..... ................................................................................................... 295
13 Agricultural marketing..................................................................................299
Kay Muir-Leresche and Chiedza Muchopa
Evolution of agricultural marketing.................................................................299
Agricultural marketing...................................................................................... 300
Producer price policy........................................................................................ 302
Market liberalization in the 1990s...................................................................303
Maize marketing................................................................................................305
Cotton marketing...............................................................................................311
Dairy marketing.................................................................................................313
Livestock and beef marketing.......................................................................... 313
Tobacco marketing............................................................................................ 314
Marketing of other commodities......................................................................315
Marketing through ZIMACE........................................................................... 316
Conclusion......................................................................................................... 317
14 Rural financial markets: historical overview 1924-1991......................... 321
Ruvimbo Chimedza
Pre-independence rural financial markets....................................................... 322
Post-independence rural financial institutions................................................323
Performance of rural finance institutions: 1980-1991 ................................  327
Informal finance.................................................................................................330
Policy issues.......................................................................................................333
15 Agricultural finance: 1990-2004..................................................................339
Naison Zumbika
Background........................................................................................................340
The rural credit market.....................................................................................342
Government funding through key agricultural ministries............................. 343
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and agro-bills.....................................................347
Private sector funding: commercial banks and agro-processors...................349
Changes in the supply of credit........................................................................ 350
Lessons from experience..................................................................................350
Conclusion......................................................................................................... 353

15
Agricultural finance: 1990-2004
Naison Zumbika
The first and second agricultural revolutions in Zimbabwe were made possible 
by a vibrant agricultural financing sector (Chimedza, 1994). In chapter 14, 
Chimedza reviewed the historical aspects of agricultural financing. Agricul­
tural formal lending peaked in 1986 when the Agricultural Finance Corpora­
tion (AFC) extended roughly 100,000 loans to smallholders but after that the 
number of loans fell sharply. This coincided with an increase in maize, cotton 
and sunflower production and an improvement in beef marketing in the small­
holder sector. However, the slump in the provision of finance called for a number 
of reforms in the Agricultural Finance Corporation and the broadening of agri­
cultural finance to include rural savings mobilization. Such policy proposals 
are now even more relevant given the escalation in the demand for agricultural 
finance following the land reform programme. In the period between the 2000 
and 2003, the government was still focusing on the land redistribution exercise 
and so little attention was given to the financing of the agricultural sector ex­
cept for some intermittent and unstructured grants channelled by government 
through the Grain Marketing Board and Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority for these institutions to secure some agricultural inputs for farmers 
in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.
With over 130,000 A 1 and A2 farmers and over 71,000 farming families in 
the old resettlement schemes and at least 2 million farming households in the 
communal areas, the demand for both working capital and financing of inputs 
is a challenge as government moves to resuscitate the agricultural sector. In the 
immediate situation, government seems to be inclined to support A2, indig­
enous large-scale and state parastatals to venture into large-scale agricultural 
projects through equipment recapitalization and infrastructural re-establishment. 
There is, however, a need to rethink the strategies for agricultural finance in 
view of the experiences of the first and second agricultural revolutions.
Chimedza focused on the successful Agricultural Finance Corporation small­
holder credit scheme from 1980 to 1989. This chapter analyzes the changes in 
agricultural finance from 1990 to 2004. Special attention will be paid to gov­
ernment sources of agricultural finance that have been handled by government 
institutions and commercial banks. It is critical to examine the efficacy of agri­
cultural finance disbursed through such commercial banks and at times through
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agro-processors. The chapter then examines the agricultural finance that origi­
nated from the private institutions and the conditions under which such financ­
ing can be made more efficient and sustainable. Lastly the chapter discusses 
the various policy options for financing agriculture, given that it is the finance 
available that will ultimately determine the success or failure of the land and 
agrarian reforms.
Background
Historically, large-scale commercial farmers were the major beneficiaries of 
most of the formal agricultural credit facilities in the agricultural sector. For­
mal financial institutions and successive colonial governments traditionally sup­
ported the predominantly white sector and neglected black rural led enterprises. 
This bias resulted in a highly skewed distribution pattern between the large- 
scale and smallholder farming sectors as smallholder farmers could not access 
formal credit facilities. After independence in 1980, the large-scale commer­
cial farming sector still had preferential treatment with respect to access to 
credit from formal financial institutions, including commercial banks, agricul­
tural cooperatives and other companies on the basis of collateralized land.
The availability of credit facilities enabled commercial farmers to mecha­
nize and capitalize most of their operations such as irrigation development and 
other farm operations. As a result of mechanization in the large-scale commer­
cial farming sector and also the added advantage of bonding of properties as 
loan collateral, the loan repayment rates were fairly high, ranging from 60 per 
cent in poor seasons to 95 per cent in good seasons (Zumbika, 2000).
During the economic structural adjustment programme period from 1991— 
1995 and in view of agricultural finance in the 1980s, there was a general dis­
enchantment with supply-led, state funding of agriculture. Over Z$1.4 billion 
was advanced to the sector in 1996, rising to well in excess of Z$4 billion in 
1999. In 1986 the number of Agricultural Finance Corporation loans to small­
holders peaked at 100,000 and then declined sharply to 50,000 in 1990 and to 
353 in 1998 (table 15.1). While there was an attempt at wholesale reform of the 
economy and its major institutions following the initiation of the economic 
structural adjustment programme, no attempt was made to reform the rural 
financial sector. The government continued to ensure a supply of inputs and 
subsidies to smallholder farmers. But this support inhibited the potential devel­
opment of new market institutions and suppliers capable of serving small pro­
ducers. Thus, demand-led market development was constrained.
In 1999 the Agricultural Finance Corporation was transformed into two 
entities, Agribank, a commercial bank, and a special fund, the Agricultural 
Development Assistance Fund. In 2000, the commercial activities of the cor­
poration were transferred to Agribank, whilst the Agricultural Development
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Table 15.1 Agricultural Finance Corporation loans to smallholder and 
commercial farmers 1990-2002
Year ended 
March
Smallholder loans 
Number Value (Z$'000)
Loans to
commercial farmers 
Value (Z$’000)
1990 49,883 43,800 295,947
1991 35,609 34,700 349,373
1992 34,378 47,030 343,044
1993 20,979 56,350 447,003
1994 17,844 83,790 554,105
1995 13,190 114,855 635,183
1996 12,736 116,870 764,038
1997 22,077 215,414 669,300
1997* 5,869 121,305 641,100
1998 353 30,696 705,900
1999 496 35.000 749,100
2000 1,849 81,429 745,100
2001 1,421 10,643 703,000
Source: AFC, Agriculture and Economic Review and internal documents. 
Notes: * In 1997, AFC’s financial year changed from April-March to January- 
December, hence there was an interim year of April-December.
Assistance Fund was created as a special service the smallholder farming sec­
tor. The splitting of the Agricultural Finance Corporation into these two enti­
ties failed to develop a sustainable rural financial system, despite the liberali­
zation of the input markets and the monetization and commercialization of 
smallholder production which had created a new and vibrant demand for credit. 
While the Agricultural Finance Corporation had committed itself to expanding 
its network in rural areas, it did not devote adequate attention to loan recovery 
and the creditworthiness of borrowers.
Although the traditional banking requirement of demanding collateral from 
borrowers cannot be applied to the smallholder farming sector due to the gen­
eral absence of tangible assets, there is great potential for financial institutions 
to mobilize savings which can be used as a form of collateral. The fact that 
even at its peak in the mid-1980s, the corporation could only cover less than 10 
per cent of the rural population, possibly indicated a high average propensity to 
save in rural areas -  what else would explain the fact that production was sus-
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tained despite the reduction of resources to and from formal sources to this 
sector?
The advantages of mobilizing rural savings are simple and varied. These 
savings could strengthen financial intermediaries and reduce dependence on 
government and donors and, more importantly, such financial independence 
would induce financial institutions to be more responsive to the local market. 
An insidious effect of the reliance on outside funds is often a tendency to weaken 
enforcement procedures in the pursuit of default cases which were always trans­
ferred to government under the government guarantee schemes o f the Agricul­
tural Finance Corporation. This reinforced bad business practices and made 
borrowers more reluctant to repay or to comply with the terms of their loans.
The rural credit market
The rural credit market in Zimbabwe has a dual structure in which formal and 
informal finance exist side by side. Since 2000, two distinct farming sectors 
have emerged in Zimbabwe. Firstly, the smallholder farming sector compris­
ing the communal, resettlement and new A 1 schemes -  this category of farmers 
required short-term credit for inputs like chemicals, fertilizers and working 
capital and, to a lesser extent, medium-term loans for machinery such as trac­
tors, ploughs and irrigation development. Secondly, the large-scale commer­
cial sector comprising small-scale commercial farmers, new A2 scheme farm­
ers and remaining large-scale commercial farms (owned by blacks and whites) 
-  this sector required both short-term loans for inputs and working capital, and 
medium-term and long-term loans for farm machinery.
The purposes of loans for rural households provided by the Agricultural 
Development Assistance Fund to smallholders were mainly for agricultural 
production and were usually seasonal. Most agricultural loans have been short­
term production loans (Nagarajan et al., 1999). These were largely available 
from the Agricultural Finance Corporation and in most cases such loans were 
based on a past track record of good loan repayments by the farmers since 
clients could not provide conventional collateral security. Large-scale com­
mercial farmers could secure short-term, medium-term and long-term loans 
from the corporation using their farms as collateral security. Most of these farm­
ers were also able to secure short-term loans from agribusiness departments of 
commercial banks using the security of their farms and even some medium- 
term loans from leasing companies such as Leasing Company of Zimbabwe, 
UDC and Scotfin for farm machinery on the security of the machinery itself 
and, in some cases, their farms as well.
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Government funding through key agricultural ministries
In the context of the fast track land reform programme backed by domestic 
resources, government sought to finance most of the agricultural activities in 
the smallholder sector. The government also sought loans from Iran, Egypt, 
Malaysia and China for the purchase o f equipment such as tractors and com­
bine harvesters and appealed to the commercial sector (banking and agro­
processing firms) to play a more active role in financing farmers.
The largest government initiative was through the crop pack input pro­
gramme disbursed through the Grain Marketing Board and the Agricultural 
and Rural Development Authority. The Grain Marketing Board crop input 
scheme was geared towards support for food grain production to ensure food 
security through the provision of seed, fertilizers and herbicides. The inputs 
were provided in the form of a low interest (20 per cent) loan repayable using a 
stop-order on grain deliveries to the Grain Marketing Board.
Through the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, government 
embarked on programmes to rehabilitate the livestock sector through the pro­
vision of finance for cattle restocking (breeding and feeding schemes). In 2001 
this was done through the Livestock Development Trust which was later incor­
porated into the Department of Livestock. Such public livestock support schemes 
were introduced to cater for livestock restocking for the smallholder and reset­
tled farmers through provision of funds to acquire heifers. Under the scheme 
the Livestock Development Trust was allocated Z$450 million and the Agri­
cultural and Rural Development Authority was allocated Z$400 million for 
disbursement to selected applicants. Depending on farm size, A2 farmers were 
eligible for up to 15 heifers while communal and A1 farmers could apply for 
two or three. A total of 6,090 farmers benefited from the schemes acquiring 
14,531 cattle worth Z$619 million. Government then assisted the Cold Storage 
Company to access relatively affordable finance from the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe for breeding and fattening in 2004. At least Z$10 billion was ob­
tained for this purpose and was being accessed by the farmers in both commu­
nal, A1 and A2 schemes. The Farmers’ Development Trust was also financed 
for the production of tobacco and paprika in specialized schemes geared to­
wards farmer training.
The irrigation rehabilitation fund was administered by the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement through the Agricultural and Rural Devel­
opment Authority with technical assistance from the departments of agricul­
tural engineering and research and extension. The interest rate on the irrigation 
rehabilitation fund was 20 per cent with a repayment period of 3-5 years. In 
2002 about Z$ 1.1 billion was disbursed to 323 applicants for the rehabilitation 
of 7,751 hectares (Manzungu, 2003).
In July 2003, the government mandated the Agricultural Bank of Zimba­
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bwe (Agribank) which was then a commercial bank and converted itself to the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe or the Land Bank, wholly owned 
by government. The main objective and mandate was to provide agricultural 
credit facilities to all the farmers in the post land reform era. The government 
ensured that this conversion was done in the shortest possible time. To this end, 
the Reserve Bank provided Z$60 billion in the 2003/04 agricultural planting 
season. The money was aimed at providing agricultural credit facilities to farm­
ers, particularly newly resettled farmers, to ensure that they brought the land 
they were offered by government to its full production potential. The Z$60 
billion credit facility was aimed at helping fanners produce enough food crops 
and to regain national food self-sufficiency. Most of the funds were channelled 
to maize growing areas.
The drier regions of the country like Masvingo and the Matabeleland prov­
inces, which normally do not do well with maize, were also supported with the 
same facility to grow some small grains such as rapoko, millet and sorghum 
which are the mainstay of these regions. This Z$60 billion loan facility was 
given as short-term loans payable at the end of the season after farmers had 
marketed their crops. This facility was given at a concessionary rate of interest 
of 15 per cent per annum.
The most significant injection of funds into the agricultural sector came in 
January 2004 when the government, through its public sector investment pro­
gramme, announced in the national budget of 2004 that Z$ 150 billion would be 
made available for farmers’ credit facilities through Agribank for the 2004/05 
planting season. The money was to be received in three tranches, starting with 
Z$50 billion as credit to farmers for the 2003/04 cropping programmes. This 
was followed in April 2004 with a further Z$50 billion for the winter wheat 
programme and Z$50 billion for the 2004 summer cropping programme. The 
money for the winter wheat programme was also meant for farmers’ working 
capital requirements such as labour costs, electricity, fuel, and repairs and main­
tenance costs.
In April 2004, the government also made some Z$150 billion available 
through the Grain Marketing Board for farmers to secure inputs and chemicals 
for the winter wheat programme. As a way of complementing government ef­
forts in raising funds for farmers, Agribank itself used Z$10 billion in August 
2004 from its loan repayments from farmers to help farmers finance their sum­
mer cropping programmes.
In August 2004, the government pledged to support tobacco farmers to 
enable them to produce a substantial volume of the crop in the 2004 planting 
season. A total of Z$406 billion was raised by government to support the to­
bacco crop and this facility was availed to farmers through various institutions 
as follows:
• Z$179 billion was channelled to farmers through Agribank to support to-
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bacco farmers with their working capital requirements;
• Z$157 billion was channelled through the Tobacco Industry Marketing 
Board to assist tobacco farmers with inputs and chemicals;
• Z$50 billion was channelled through the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe 
to assist tobacco farmers with their working capital requirements; and
• Z$20 billion was made available through Sybank to assist tobacco farmers 
with their working capital requirements.
The government, through the Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe, raised a further Z$600 
billion to support farmers’ summer crop programmes for the 2004/05 season. 
Out of the Z$600 billion loan facility, Agribank received a total o f Z$110 bil­
lion. The money was used for the livestock resuscitation programme (Z$50 
billion) to help farmers buy additional livestock. The facility was given as a 
medium-term loan facility, payable over a period of five years at an interest 
rate of 50 per cent per annum. Part of the money (Z$50 billion) was used by 
Agribank to extend credit facilities to farmers for rehabilitation o f their irriga­
tion schemes. This facility was offered as a medium-term loan facility, payable 
over a period o f five years at 50 per cent rate of interest per annum. The re­
maining Z$10 billion was extended to farmers as working capital for summer 
crops, particularly maize, and this was given as short-term loans payable at the 
end o f the season when farmers marketed their crop. This facility was given at 
a rate of interest of 50 per cent per annum as well. The remaining portion of 
this Z$600 billion facility, $490 billion, was all channelled through the Grain 
Marketing Board to provide agricultural inputs to fanners for the maize crop.
Agribank then used the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s productive sector 
facility to extend capital development loans to farmers for the purchase o f farm 
machinery and equipment. A total of Z$45 billion was extended to farmers 
during the 2004 farming season. Therefore the Reserve Bank made available 
Z$1.6 trillion through the various agricultural schemes which was about Z$774 
billion above government finance. Table 15.2 shows a summary of funds chan­
nelled by the government to the agricultural sector through Agribank.
The Z$494 billion loans extended to the agricultural sector through Agribank 
did not include the Z$227 billion of the tobacco facility. The money was chan­
nelled through the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, Commercial Bank of 
Zimbabwe and Sybank to support the tobacco inputs scheme. In addition, Z$490 
billion was given to Grain Marketing Board to support the maize crop and 
Z$150 billion for the wheat inputs scheme. Table 15.3 is a summary o f addi­
tional funds into the agricultural sector in the 2004 season.
Government channelled a total of Z$2.09 trillion into the agricultural sec­
tor through credit facilities to farmers in 2004. This excluded finance from 
commercial banks and private companies that provided various types of finan­
cial resources. Agribank was provided with Z$150 billion through the public
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Table 15.2 Government financial support to farmers through Agribank for 
the 2004 farming season (Z$)
Month Amount 
received (Z$)
No. of 
beneficiaries
Purpose
January 50 billion 7,971 To provide top-up loans for maize 
and small grains.
March 50 billion 2,348 For the winter wheat programme
July 25 billion 2,370 For summer crops
August 25 billion 1,723 For summer crops
September 10 billion 310 From Agribank’s loan repayments 
and given out for support of the 
summer crops
October 79 billion 3,758 For tobacco crop working capital 
requirements
10 billion 310 For maize crop working capital 
requirements
November 50 billion 356 For supporting livestock programme
50 billion 141 For irrigation development
December 100 billion 1,648 Additional tobacco working capital 
funds
45 billion 642 Productive sector facilities
Total funds 495 billion 21,577
Table 15.3: Government support to the agricultural sector through Tobacco 
Industry Marketing Board, Grain Marketing Board and commercial banks 
in 2004
Month Amount
(Z$)
Institution handling 
the facility
Purpose
April 150 billion GMB Winter wheat programme inputs
November 227 billion TIMB, CBZ, Sybank Tobacco programme support
November 490 billion GMB Maize crop inputs support
December 729 billion All commercial banks Agricultural loans through RBZ 
productive sector facility
Key: GMB = Grain Marketing Board; TIMB = Tobacco Industry Marketing Board; CBZ 
= Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe; RBZ = Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
*The figure of Z$729 billion above excludes Z$45 billion granted by Agribank through 
the Public Sector Fund as well.
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Table 15.4: Government agricultural financial support to farmers through 
Agribank for the 2005/07 farming season (Z$)
Purpose A m ount
Working capital for current tobacco crop Z$20 billion
Working capital for harvesting and marketing current maize crop Z$60 billion
Livestock Programme support Z$30 billion
Farm equipment and machinery support Z$20 billion
Irrigation development support Z$20 billion
Total Z$150 billion
sector investment programme for 2005 to support farmers with credit facilities 
for various seasonal agricultural programmes as indicated in table 15.4.
To ensure that Agribank was well placed to service all farmers with agri­
cultural credit facilities in an efficient manner, the government provided Z$ 14.3 
billion to Agribank as institutional support to strengthen its operational organs. 
Of the total amount, Z$9.8 billion was used to purchase motor vehicles for 
field loan officers to ease transport problems in reaching out to all farmers. In a 
decentralized strategy, the bank used Z$3.0 billion for staff housing and Z$1.5 
billion for office accommodation in the provinces. This has given the bank a 
strong presence in all provinces in Zimbabwe.
Despite all efforts at re-engineering Agribank, the tendency of loan de­
faulting has emerged as a serious issue which could compromise the bank in 
delivering on its mandate. For example as at 31 December 2004, only Z$55 
billion had been realized as loan repayments by the bank against a total figure 
of Z$142 billion granted earlier which was all due and payable by 31 Decem­
ber 2004. In this respect, provincial management, assisted by the debt recover­
ies department and the bank’s legal department, have been under pressure to 
pursue loan defaulters to ensure that all the outstanding debts were paid to the 
bank to enable the establishment of a revolving loan structure in the agricul­
tural sector.
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and agro-bills
In 2002, the government mooted the idea of agro-bills to recapitalize the agri­
cultural sector following the fast track land reform programme. A total of Z$7.2 
billion was raised against a target set Z$60 billion. The Standard Chartered and 
Barclays banks raised Z$5 billion (Mukwezera and Manzungu, 2003). Syfrets 
Corporate and Merchant Bank (Sybank) was appointed as the lead issuing au­
thority for agro-bills and agri-bonds. The sum raised was inadequate to meet
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farmers’ requirements and the strategy adopted was to mobilize more resources 
through further issues. Later on, they proved popular because o f a 75 per cent 
return on investment. Consequently, a flotation of agro-bills in 2003 was over­
subscribed, raising Z$5 billion when the target had been Z$2 billion. The inter­
est rate on the 2003 bills was 75 per cent, a rate considered rather punitive for 
farming which contributed to the low uptake. Agro-bills have become an im­
portant source o f fund-raising for institutions such as agricultural parastatals. 
Most investors feel that they provide a favourable rate of return on their invest­
ment.
The bills were intended for working capital and were to be repaid in 270 
days. Mukwezera and Manzungu (2003) identified a number of problems with 
the agro-bills. Firstly they were launched late -  well into the cropping season -  
which limited their impact on production. Secondly, although they carried gov­
ernment guarantee, one government-owned bank required applicants to pro­
vide additional surety to secure a commitment from borrowers to repay. This 
was claimed to result in higher repayment rates. Thirdly, one agro-processing 
company received Z$4 billion out o f the Z$7 billion that was on offer because 
of lack o f effective regulations to guide the disbursement process. Across all 
sectors, 32,375 farmers were reported to have benefited from agro-bills through 
banks and agro-processors. Most beneficiaries were from Manicaland and the 
three Mashonaland provinces. Few farmers from the Midlands and even fewer 
from Masvingo and Matabeleland benefited because the money was repayable 
in nine months. This timeframe was too short for cattle ranching which re­
quires a long gestation period for maturing and marketing of herd.
In addition to the direct government finance assistance schemes described, 
government undertook a number of initiatives through the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe which were targeted at various sectors of the agricultural industry. 
Farmers and agricultural firms could access funds through the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe revolving fund, a general incentive scheme targeted at the produc­
tive and export sectors of the economy. Under the scheme producers could 
access funds at concessionary interest rates set at 15 per cent and 5 per cent for 
the productive and export sectors respectively, with loans being channelled 
through agro-processors or commercial banks. The funds were meant for work­
ing capital purposes (not long-term investments) and were repayable in 180 
days. Agriculture accounted for about 40 per cent of total use.
In August 2002, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe provided a Z$1 billion 
facility through Agribank for the production of tobacco seedlings at an interest 
rate of 25 per cent. The Tobacco Industry Marketing Board administered the 
scheme. The cumulative use of the fund was much less than expected as funds 
were released late for seedbed establishment resulting in only Z$150 million of 
allocated money being used. The board estimated that 3,500 to 3,700 hectares 
were put under tobacco seedbeds through the initiative. After further negotia­
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tion the Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe agreed to release about Z$500 million 
under the scheme for tobacco growing inputs for the 2002/03 season. In addi­
tion to this amount, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe provided tobacco inputs 
dedicated funds of Z$39 billion for the 2002/03 season.
Private sector funding: commercial banks and agro-processors
Most funding earmarked for agro-processors was from agro-bills, notwithstand­
ing that the agro-bills were intended to augment planned financing arrange­
ments. Amongst agro-processors that assisted new farmers were FSI Agricom, 
Cottco, Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited, Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority, Irvine’s, Seed Co, Ingwebu Breweries and Delta Corporation 
(Chibuku Breweries). Delta’s Chibuku Breweries financed fanners in the pro­
duction o f sorghum and maize whilst the National Breweries supported farm­
ers producing barley. The FSI Agricom and Consolidated Farming Investments 
scheme offered financial and management support to farmers producing a range 
of crops and products the companies need for their businesses such as cotton, 
beef, maize, sorghum and piggery projects as well.
Each agro-processor drew up a contract with its farmers. The contracts 
differed with a number of them quoting different producer prices of maize, a 
controlled commodity. A total of Z $ ll billion was provided by commercial 
banks to agro-processors. Disbursement of money through agro-processors was 
considered to be a prudent risk-management strategy in addition to reducing 
transaction costs. Agro-processors have a strong presence on the ground and 
are informed of the potential for different enterprises in various parts of the 
country. Agro-processing companies provide extension services, monitor farmers 
and assist with produce marketing. Such strategies can result in higher repay­
ment rates.
Commodity organizations increasingly play a significant role in financing 
the production of particular crojis they use in their businesses. Such organiza­
tions included Cottco, Cotpro, and Cargill which financed farmers to pro­
duce cotton throughout the country and such credit lines are being offered to all 
categories of smallholder and commercial farmers. Cargill signed a deal with 
CFX Merchant Bank Limited to allocate Z$150 million to farmers for the pro­
duction of cotton. Paprika Zimbabwe (Private) Limited financed large-scale
commercial, medium-scale commercial (A2s) and smallholder farmers to pro­
duce paprika, while Duke Food and Spice Company (Private) Limited financed 
farmers to produce chillies which the company processes for export. Reapers
Cotpro was eventually bought out by Cottco. It used to serve mostly the market needs of 
I74the large-scale commercial farmers whose land was acquired by the government. 
Business Herald, 6 January 2003.
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(Private) Limited financed both large-scale and smallholder farmers to pro­
duce groundnuts which the company processes for export.
Changes in the supply of credit
Since the land reform programme in 2000, there has been a noticeable change 
in the number of suppliers of rural credit with a growth in the number of such 
institutions. Their conduct has also changed to reflect the reality on the ground. 
For example, there has been an increase in the number of institutions providing 
credit in kind to smallholders growing cotton. These institutions include Cottco, 
FSI Agricom, Cargill, and the Farmers World. However, government remains 
the single largest direct retailer of agricultural credit. The estimated value of 
inputs for 2001 was Z$15.5 billion and most of this was from the fiscus. There 
is little evidence though to suggest that this is sustainable, given that the policy 
foundations of this input distribution system were extremely weak. By their 
nature, input loans addressed short-term production problems. The new gen­
eration of resettled small-scale and medium-scale farmers will require more 
medium-term and long-term credit to finance investments in irrigation and farm 
mechanization.
An analysis of financing agriculture in Zimbabwe reveals that government 
rural financial institutions are often inefficient and unsustainable. Outreach is 
severely truncated by the lack of financial resources at key institutions such as 
Agribank and the Agricultural Development Assistance Fund. Several unre­
solved issues Constrain the development of a sustainable rural credit market in 
Zimbabwe, for instance, there is an apparent trade-off between sustainability, 
as measured by the institutions’ ability to generate profits, and outreach de­
fined as the ability to reach out to the poor. With the minimal success of group 
lending in Zimbabwe, the element of transaction costs in rural finance has re­
mained unattended to, and pay-off scales have tended to be loaded against small 
loans. Cursory evidence suggests that repayment rates are higher where loan 
size -  and with it profitability -  is higher.
Lessons from experience
In 1968 David Penny offered a significant pointer that is relevant to the direc­
tion that Zimbabwe must take to create successful rural financial institutions. 
Penny notes that ‘most farmers do not have to be bribed with cheap credit to 
adopt profitable innovations if there is a satisfactory market for additional out­
put’ . The agricultural finance policies adopted to date in Zimbabwe have been 
ineffectual and inefficient, and have failed to promote growth and equity. How­
ever, the three-fold growth of the Agricultural Development Assistance Fund 
demonstrated that financial services can be extended to rural farmers at rela­
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tively lower costs and more sustainably than was previously deemed possible. 
It also demonstrates that when a crop is profitable and farmers have an assured 
market, they do not need to be ‘bribed’ through interest subsidies. In fact it 
shows that farmers can repay loans at real rates of interest. There are four key 
issues that face the financing of agriculture in Zimbabwe outlined as follows:
1 Risks and administrative costs
The funding by government through its institutions proved to be an unsatisfac­
tory method of financing the agricultural sector and the new farmers for the 
following reasons:
Distributing agricultural inputs to the new farmers proved problematic for 
the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority and Grain Marketing Board 
as they were overwhelmed by the numbers of farmers. To satisfy a large per­
centage of these farmers by giving them the required quantities of agricultural 
inputs, the institutions had to devote all their energies to this exercise and aban­
don their core functions for which they were established. The result was that 
the institutions failed to deliver on their core functions as well as on the input 
distribution side and this is borne out by well-documented criticism o f these 
two institutions in the period 2001-2003 as they were expected to cany out this 
complex mission. It is not surprising therefore that there were no meaningful 
loan repayments realized by these two institutions from the inputs they distrib­
uted to farmers in that period. The sheer volume o f new farmers who secured 
inputs through these institutions overwhelmed them to the extent that the 
logistical demands o f the exercise proved way beyond the capacity of the Grain 
Marketing Board and the Agricultural Rural Development Authority at the time. 
This proved to government that such a method of financing agricultural devel­
opment was not only fraught with numerous logistical problems but was also 
inefficient and, above all, not sustainable.
There is also a general belief in most financial institutions that farming is a 
risky venture which is susceptible to dry spells. Most financial institutions ex­
tend credit to farmers sparingly after considering the farm establishment, for 
example, whether there is irrigation and also whether farmers are growing high 
value cash crops. For commercial banks, the farmer’s experience and a good 
bank track record also have significant influence on whether or not to extend 
credit to a farmer. Commercial banks are reluctant to engage in micro-financ­
ing due to the perceived risk and high administration costs associated with that 
market segment, hence a meaningful level of loans has not been extended by 
commercial banks to smallholder farmers so far.
2 Poor mobilization of agricultural resources through savings
Perhaps the biggest failure o f the present rural financial system was its found­
ing assumption that poor people were too poor to save and required cheap
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credit (Chimedza, 1994; Zumbika, 2000). This seriously undermined the own­
ership and sustainability of the institutions serving the rural community. Reli­
ance on public funding not only exposed such institutions to political manipu­
lation but also subjected them to severe budgetary constraints in the event of 
macro-economic decline as Zimbabwe has experienced in the post land reform 
period. Furthermore, economic reform induced fiscal containment virtually 
eliminated subsidies and significantly reduced other government subventions 
leading to the practical drying up of credit as the trends from 2000 showed.
3 Tenure security and legal framework
The debate over the security of land tenure continues currently because most 
fanners do not have title to their land, particularly in communal, resettlement, 
A1 and A2 schemes. Commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans to these 
farmers because they lack adequate and acceptable forms of collateral. Com­
mercial banks are used to lending against conventional collateral. Therefore it 
is not surprising that in the absence of an intervening policy by government 
there will be very little flow of loan funds from commercial banks to the com­
munal, resettlement, A1 and A2 farmers who currently do not hold any title or 
leasehold on their properties. In an effort to minimize the risk o f default on 
loans granted, most financial institutions prefer to finance farmers with collat­
eral security or those with irrigation systems which minimize crop failures due 
to drought. It is therefore imperative that government devises policies to en­
courage financial institutions to extend credit to the newly resettled A1 and A2 
farmers as well as to communal and old resettlement farmers.
To enforce loan contracts, the communal tenurial system is another unre­
solved constraint. The tenurial system gives an individual a secure and nor­
mally inheritable right to property but does not offer permanent property rights 
which may reduce investment incentives. Due to perceived and severe moral 
hazard problems, private sector institutions have been reluctant to service rural 
markets in the absence of collateral and a legal and regulatory framework. This, 
combined with interest rate ceilings, lack o f innovation in product design and a 
singular reliance on external rather than internal sources of funds for lending, 
has been responsible for low recovery rates. Institutional foundations for fi­
nancial markets in rural areas are lacking. Lenders need a system that provides 
formal procedures for claims against property and enforcement of financial 
contracts. It is possible that ‘titling and registering land; reforming the law of 
secured transactions, such as legally acceptable forms of collateral; establish­
ing legal registries and expanding the scope for private operation; lowering the 
costs o f registration and foreclosure; drafting specific, clear and limited home­
stead provisions; and removing interest rate ceilings’ (Yaron et al., 1998:152) 
may be necessary.
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4 Lack of coordination amongst financing institutions
While there appears to be an impressive directory of both public and private 
financial institutions and organizations offering different types of agricultural 
credit to farmers in Zimbabwe, there is no coordination in their operations, 
leading to an uneven distribution of credit, a duplication of activities and some­
times conflicting approaches. For example, one bank may be siphoning sav­
ings to the urban areas, while at the same time a development institution is 
struggling to raise capital to give to the same clientele. An ideal system in that 
case would be an integrated savings-credit system with linkages wherever pos­
sible. The lack of coordination among the different institutions and organiza­
tions currently offering credit to farmers has resulted in unfairness in the distri­
bution of credit to farmers in some cases. For example, cases abound where 
powerful individuals who have access to inputs through the Grain Marketing 
Board input scheme manage to secure similar inputs through the Agricultural 
and Rural Development Authority input scheme, the Farmer Development Trust 
and possibly even secure credit from Agribank. In such cases it is possible for 
some farmers to end up obtaining and stocking enough inputs to see them through 
the next three to four years while other poor farmers are desperately trying to 
raise enough inputs for the current season.
The financing of the agricultural sector requires resources on a sustainable 
basis which have to be mobilized from multiple sources. However, it is the 
management of these resources which is usually problematic. Problems such 
as unequal resource allocation, verification of resource use and repayments of 
loans, require strong and effective management in institutions which allows for 
better coordination of resources among financing institutions and effectively 
facilitates production.
Conclusion
At both macro and sectoral levels, government economic policies have not 
created an environment or incentives to encourage the development of a viable 
rural financial market. For example, input and output prices have been control­
led, decontrolled and recontrolled. The government has sought to directly con­
trol input distribution in the country and despite regular adverse weather occur­
rences, government has not actively developed irrigation infrastructure, evi­
denced by the national farm irrigation fund being allocated only Z$10 million 
in the 2002 budget which was way below the requirements for resuscitating the 
irrigation system in the new resettled areas.
There is a huge demand for agricultural finance and most new farms being 
established lack access to adequate funds. Small-scale farms have been par­
ticularly disadvantaged because agricultural finances were reduced during the 
economic structural adjustment period and the demand for both short-term and
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long-term finance has grown since 2000. At first commercial banks did not 
play an active part as the country was overwhelmed by the conflicts over land 
reform and broader political issues. Government’s resolve to proceed with the 
land reform programme created an untenable situation with regard to agricul­
tural financing. Most funding was then channelled through commercial banks 
and other funding organizations that in the past have tended to regard small­
holders as a high risk group. However, there remained a certain level of cau­
tiousness among commercial banks who were sceptical of the land reform pro­
gramme. The absence of regulatory requirements which would allow commer­
cial banks to carry out micro-financing operations led to calls for policy re­
forms. Restructuring the Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe and establishing new bank­
ing procedures, which include the regulatory requirements of micro-financing 
operations by commercial banks, were ways of improving the environment. 
However, these measures alone were not enough as there is need for a focused 
agricultural policy framework and regulatory environment.
The public development financing institutions, such as the Agricultural 
Development Assistance Fund, were dogged by under-capitalization which left 
the institutions unable to provide adequate loans to farmers. While a number of 
public organizations, private banks and private companies availed credit to farm­
ers in one form or the other, lack of coordination of the operations resulted in 
an unfair and uneven distribution of credit to farmers in some cases.
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